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Bank regulation in this country dates back more than a century and a quarter.
It came into being as soon as there was general realization that a bank failure could
be more destructive to individuals and to a community than the failure of any other
type of enterprise. This is simply because bank liabilities for the most part are held
by businesses and individuals and constitute circulating medium. Accordingly, the
closing of a bank not only worked hardship on the individual by destroying-or
making temporarily unavailable-a portion of his monetary resources, but also, and
perhaps more important, a bank failure frequently paralyzed the economic life of the
community. On occasion, when failures were numerous, an entire state, or even the
nation, was prostrated.
Thus, bank regulation, rudimentary but in a form familiar to us today, first
appeared in conjunction with other types of proposals designed to protect individuals
and communities against bank failure. Probably the first comprehensive bank regulatory system was included with the first deposit insurance plan, adopted by the State
of New York in 1829. Certainly regulation was present in the "free banking" acts
which first appeared in 1837-1838 in Michigan and New York and soon spread across
the country. These acts were designed not only to facilitate entry into banking but
also, and perhaps more important, to protect against the consequences of bank failure
by requiring the pledging of collateral against circulating notes issued by banks.
Thus, bank regulation appeared in this country approximately a quarter-century
before the insurance industry came under government's watchful guidance and more
than forty years before states began to regulate public utilities.1
Regulation of banks spread throughout the states during the decades following
the i83os and was generally prevalent by the turn of the century However, in a
few instances states did not begin seriously to regulate banks until the early years
of the present century. During this time, the federal government also entered the
bank regulatory field. First, as a natural consequence of providing for federal chartering of commercial banks in 1863, federal regulation of banking was provided for
national banks. Following the panic of 19o7 and the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System in 1913, federal supervision was extended to those state banks which

*A.B. 1932, University of North Carolina; Stonier Graduate School of Banking, 1940. President,
Amercian Bankers Association, z966. Chairman, Board of Directors, Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, since i956. President of the Research Triangle Foundation of North Carolina. Former Director and
Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Member of Board of Trustees of University of North Carolina,
Salem Academy and Salem College, and Converse College.
'See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. X13 (1877). For information on the origins and extensiveness of early
bank regulation, see Champion, Private Enterprise and Public Responsibility in a Free Economy, NAT'L
INDunThAL CoNFERENCE BoAmm REcoRi, June 1966, at 18; 1953 FDIC Amw. REP. 59.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

chose to enter the Federal Reserve System. Indeed, one of the goals of the formulators
of the Federal Reserve Act-as stated in the preamble of that act-was "to establish a
more effective supervision of banking in the United States."2 Despite early expectations that the new system would eventually embrace all banks, large numbers
of state banks remained outside of the Federal Reserve System. However, following
the dramatic banking collapse of the early i93os, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation was created and given regulatory power over all state banks participating
in deposit insurance but not members of the Federal Reserve System.
Today commercial bank regulation involves fifty separate state agencies and three
federal banking agencies. Perhaps the most striking fact-particularly when compared with bank supervision prior to 1935-is that virtually all commercial banks are
subject to some degree of federal regulation, even though every state also exercises
regulatory authority over the banks it charters. The only commercial banks not
subject to federal supervision are those relatively few banks-numbering only 22i at
the end of 19 65-which have state charters and are not insured by the FDIC.
I
Ti

GoAms AND NATURE OF BANK REGULATION

Basically, bank regulation can be said to have a single goal: the prevention of
bank failure. However, because of the extensive and detailed nature of bank supervision, regulation takes on more than this essentially negative function and seeks in
addition to guide the banking industry into paths which will provide the public with
necessary services. But bank safety still remains the primary and overriding goal.
In this connection it should be noted that bank regulation differs fundamentally
from that accorded public utilities and most other regulated industries. There the
primary concern is abuse of monopoly or near-monopoly situations, so that price
is strictly regulated. In commercial banking-with almost 14,000 separate institutions-regulation is rarely concerned with monopoly or price but is concerned
rather with soundness and operations. Indeed, there have been occasions when the
major problem of bank regulators was to reduce competition in the interests of
protecting the public against the consequences of failure. Whether this particular
aspect of bank regulation has been carried too far is a point taken up later.
Basically, regulatory agencies-both state and federal-attempt to maintain safe
and sound banking practices through the establishment of regulations and by examination. Regulations permit a range within which banker judgment may be exercised,
while establishing bounds beyond which practice has suggested that it might be
imprudent to go. The limitation on the amount a bank may lend unsecured to one
borrower is akin to the old maxim, "You shouldn't put all your eggs in one basket."
Most other regulations are equally sensible although they may involve a higher degree
of specialized application to banking practices.
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A basic characteristic of supervision is close observation by bank examiners of the
management practices of individual bankers. It is possible to follow the rules exactly
and yet to overlook some things that appear potentially dangerous to a man of broader
experience. This is the most important part of bank surveillance because the primary
task of an examiner is to determine the net sound capital of each institution. Thus
the examiner is required to value each bank asset and, in a real sense, sits in judgment
on management decisions on loans and investments.
Another vital aspect of bank regulation involves the structure of banking markets,
primarily as affected by new chartering and branching. In the 1830s, "free banking"
was intended to permit unrestricted entry into banking so long as the organizers met
certain statutory standards. This was an understandable reaction to banking by special
legislative charter, which frequently depended upon political favoritism, if not worse.
However, the states gradually moved away from unrestricted entry and adopted
various types of control over chartering in an effort to guard against excessive competition or so-called "overbanking." Additional controls over bank chartering were
later adopted by federal agencies. Today entry into banking is regulated at two
levels-first, through the chartering authority of the states or of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and, second, through the granting of insurance in the
case of state banks. The same is true in the case of branching (where permitted by
state law) since after state-chartered banks receive the necessary approval from their
state supervisory authorities, those which are members of the Federal Reserve System
must obtain approval from the Federal Reserve, while state nonmember banks must
obtain approval from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Bank regulation also extends to other significant areas of banking structure. For
example, the bank merger law of 1966' appeared to give substantial authority over
bank mergers to the three federal banking agencies; the extent to which this authority
is finally centered in the banking agencies has just recently been tested in the courts,
however, with the result that agency authority is of a preliminary character only.4
Also it might be noted that bank holding companies are regulated by the federal
government, in this case by a single agency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
If the goal of bank regulation is to prevent bank failure, it may be asked how this
ties in with the fact that the federal government also provides deposit insurance to
guard against the consequences of bank failure. Putting it another way, is bank
regulation really necessary so long as the federal government, through the FDIC, is
prepared to protect the public from failures? For example, it has been suggested
that the regulatory authorities should not strive too diligently to prevent bank
failures. Representative Patman remarked at the dedication of the Federal Deposit
312 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c)
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Insurance Corporation building that there were not enough bank failures His
feeling stems from the belief that banking markets are not sufficiently competitive and
that, if they were more competitive, bank customers would benefit: "When we boast
of no bank failures, let's remember that several thousand other business firms may
have failed because the banks did not take as many reasonable risks as they might
7
have taken."
There is no question that deposit insurance helps prevent fundamentally sound
banks from being drawn into a financial whirlpool of the type that occurred during
the depression of the nineteen thirties. Many banks with sound assets were forced
into difficulty by sudden and massive deposit withdrawals. If there had been time
for things to work themselves out many banks would not have been forced to shut
their doors, but there never was enough time for many. Financial panics of the type
which marred American history until 1933 have not occurred since the deposit
insurance legislation was enacted.
While deposit insurance will protect small depositors, larger depositors are not
protected by federal insurance." In addition, the loss of convenience and service
rendered by each banking office in the event of failure would be considerable even
if deposits were not lost. Long established credit relationships would be brought
abruptly to a halt, possibly interrupting local production, and depositors would
be inconvenienced by the need to secure new banking services. Therefore, the
emphasis in regulation today is no less on maintenance of individual banks in sound
condition than it ever was.
Since 933-that is, during the past 33 years-there have been a total of 594 bank
failures. This number may be contrasted with an average of 500 to 6oo bank failures
per year during the prosperous years of the 192os, and more than 9,000 bank failures
during the great depression of the early i93os. Probably we will never know to what
extent this remarkable record since 1933 can be attributed to improved bank regulation and to what extent it can be attributed to deposit insurance. Undoubtedly each
deserves a substantial share of the credit.
II
STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION

The dual banking system in the United States is unique in the civilized world.
Most simply, it means that a commercial bank may be chartered by either state or
federal authorities and thenceforth be supervised by the chartering authority. As
we have seen, in the case of state banks supervision is applied by both state and
federal authorities. But state law and state regulation are nevertheless the dominant
8
N.Y.
7

Times, June 17, 1963, at 35, col. 3.

fd.

'Larger depositors are fully protected in those situations where the FDIC arranges for the assumption
of all deposits of a failing bank by another insured bank, rather than resorting to individual payments up
to $15,000.

BANKING REGULATION: A BANKER'S VIEW

influences over state banks, which comprise the majority of the commercial banks in
the country and hold just under half of the total assets in the commercial banking
system. Since it is this basic duality which gives to the commercial banking system
much of the vigor and adaptability required by a free enterprise society, it is proper
to ask how the regulatory systems are operating at both the state and federal levels.
Unfortunately, there are problems in both areas. While some states have supervisory departments which are the equal in quality to the federal agencies, too many
other states are failing in this regard. Very roughly, one might estimate that bank
regulation is significantly below standard in probably a third of our states. The causes
are varied, but most can be traced to the failure of state legislatures and the respective
banking communities to recognize the importance of adequate supervision of banks
at the state level.
If the only objective of bank regulation is to prevent bank failure, perhaps we need
not be concerned about the fact that in many of our states the bank commissioner
is a minor official, that banking department personnel are underpaid and relatively
untrained, and that supervisory budgets are inadequate. But with bank regulation
goes the power to guide and shape the progress of banking. To the extent that the
states fail to provide adequate supervision, they also abandon to the federal government the right to determine the kind of banking which should exist in their state.
Fortunately, we find today that the states are becoming increasingly aware of the
importance of maintaining adequate regulatory bodies and are making significant

progress in upgrading their regulatory systems.
At the federal level the difficulties are not inadequate budgets or insufficient personnel but overlapping and conflicting authority. This has become particularly
noticeable in recent years. To some extent, given the tripartite arrangement of
federal banking regulation, the possibilities for friction will always be present. After
all, because of its insurance function the FDIC has some concern for the soundness of
all insured banks, whether state-chartered or federally chartered and whether members or nonmembers of the Federal Reserve System. Similarly, the Federal Reserve
has an interest in all of its member banks, whether federally or state chartered. Thus,
for the federal regulatory system to work well there must be a strong spirit of
cooperation and tolerance among the three agencies. This has not been particularly
evident within recent years, and perhaps can be corrected to some extent by sharpening up federal statutes to eliminate those areas where the limits of authority are
obscure. But in the long run, if we are to avoid centralization of federal control
of banking there must be evidenced a much improved degree of cooperation among
the three federal banking agencies.
III
BANK REGULATION AND THE FUTuRE

Because banking regulation is so intimately concerned with the welfare of banksin the sense of protecting the public against failure-it plays a crucial role in deter-
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mining how rapidly, and in what direction, banking can progress. This would
not be the case if bank regulation resembled the regulation of public utilities, but the
intense concentration of bank regulation on operations and safety make it inevitable
that it play the role described. Thus a cautious regulator or a restrictive set of statutes
can repress innovation and delay change, while an overenthusiastic regulator or
statutes loosely drawn may permit change at too rapid a pace. Let us turn, then, to
consider just a few of the issues which both regulators and bankers must face together
in the years ahead.
A. Competition
It is clear that full and unfettered competition would not be suitable for the
banking industry, and neither state legislatures nor the federal government have
moved this position. Nevertheless, the frequent suggestion that more competition is
needed should make everyone think once again about the industry and the direction
in which it is moving. Are banks providing the fullest possible range of services
compatible with prudent lending standards? Is innovation of new services brisk?
Are banks providing too many services which greatly increase their risk exposure?
Charges and countercharges fly, as they always do, but the answers to these questions
will not come from emotional outbursts. We need painstaking study by bankers,
by academic economists, and by other interested parties into the facts concerning the
market structure of banking. It is encouraging to see that progress is being made
in this area and that more work is constantly being initiated
The American Bankers Association is doing what it can with its limited resources
to further the much needed research in this area. Early in 1966 the Association
awarded the National Bureau of Economic Research a grant of $2ioooo spread over
three years to underwrite an investigation into the effect of banking market structure
on bank performance. Legislation to change banking almost always affects the balance in banking market, and yet we now know very little about such changes and
the effect they have on interest rates, credit availability, loan repayments and other
vital matters of public concern. The National Bureau will not answer all our
questions, but it will open the door that leads to answers wider than it has ever been
opened before.
B. Nonbank Financial Institutions
The growth of nonbank financial institutions has been remarkably rapid, particularly in the years since the end of the Second World War. Savings and loan associations moved from an industry with $8.7 billion assets in 1945 to $1294 billion assets
at the end of 1965. Credit unions which had $400 million in assets at the end of the
Second World War had $io.6 billion in assets at the close of x965. Similarly, the
'For an overview of the highly complex literature on this subject, see Edwards, The Banking Cornpetition Controversy, 3 NAT'I BANKING REv. " (1965), reprinted in U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, STuOIES IN
BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE 303 (1966).
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mutual fund industry came into its own in the postwar years while small-loan companies and various private credit arrangements by retails stores all grew rapidly.
Many nonbank financial institutions-such as savings and loan associations and
credit unions-have specialized lending functions and have been given supervision
specially tailored to their particular requirements. But as they have grown they inevitably tend to move into areas historically reserved for commercial banks. Perhaps
this is natural, but it does pose questions of the extent to which the relatively strict
standards of bank regulation should be extended to nonbank institutions or, contrariwise, whether somewhat easier standards should be applied to commercial banks.
In any event, some adjustment will have to be made if commercial banks and
nonbank financial institutions become more and more competitive in the same
markets.
One thing that must be borne in mind by the regulatory authorities, however, is
that more regulations pertaining to banks will not deal with instabilities that are not
part of the commercial banking system. True, banks hold the demand deposits, and
they are the bookkeepers for the transactions. But if other types of financial intermediaries are successful, for example, in raising the income velocity of money in a
destabilizing way, the answer is not to add more controls to commercial banks just
because their depositors use demand deposits more intensively.
C. Limited Entry
One of the areas of bank regulation currently under the most intense scrutiny is
the ease of difficulty of new entry into the business in various states. The object
is to achieve a degree of workable competition1" which will help to insure the greatest
efficiency possible in the banking industry without generating so much competition
that the existence of any one competitor is threatened. Banks across the country
have shown great interest in opening new offices where they are permitted, and in
unit-banking states there has been a good deal of interest in the chartering of new
banks. The Comptroller of the Currency has been particularly receptive in recent
years to charter applications from certain areas, and economists from his office have
published articles in the National Banking Review which tend to indicate that
greater competition has brought decided benefits.' The spectrum of studies existing
" The expression "workable competition" was introduced by J. M. Clark in his well-known article,
Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REV. 241 (1940). Clark expresses workable
competition in terms of specific conditions which per se establish competition. Jesse W. Markham has subsequenfly suggested that workable competition need not be defined in terms of arbitrary conditions but
in terms of industry performance, regardless of the nature of the industry. See Markham, An Alternative
Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 AM. EcoN. RaV. 349 (1950). Thus, the concept
of workable competition is not a rigid one, although the terminology is frequently used and most
economists would come reasonably close to agreeing on the factors that delineate it. The performance
criterion is now accepted much more widely than the structure criterion by economists, but the courts
seem willing to approach problems in structural terms.
1
" Horvitz & Shull, The Impact of Branch Banking on Bank Performance, 2 NAT'L BANxING REV. z43
(1964); Motter, Bank Formation and the Public Interest, id. at 299 (1965); Motter & Carson, Bank Entry
and the Public Interest: A Case Study, , id. at 469 (1964); Shull & Horvitz, Branch Banking and the
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-on bank entry, however, are not as unequivocal concerning the benefits of less restricted entry as the articles in the Comptroller's Review would suggest.'2 There have
been some situations where regulatory agencies have been very reluctant to permit new
entry-perhaps because they knew more about the local situation than was obvious
from the outside. But on the whole, there is little reason to believe that policies on
chartering or entry into banking markets through branching have been unduly
restrictive in the postwar period.
One measure of the volume of banking services available in an area is the number
of persons per office. Where branching is prevalent, the number of persons per office
declined by about 850 persons between 196o and 1964, and the number of persons per
office declined by 434 in states where unit banking is prevalent.' s The average population per banking office for all fifty states was 6,469 on December 3, 1964, about 700
persons per office fewer than the average four years earlier.
D. Bank Services
Unlike the regulated utilities, the banking industry is seldom required to provide
or maintain a specific service other than to remain solvent and to accept deposits.
More often than not, bank regulators are concerned about banks providing too much
service, which may raise a bank's expenses too rapidly for safety or greatly expand
its risk exposure. Most bank regulations, in fact, specify services which banks may
not provide rather than those that banks may provide. For both the regulators and
the regulated, it is easy to fall into the ostrich-like pose of never doing anything
for the first time. This is the attitude that killed other industries, and this is the
attitude that can kill banking. Regulation is guidance, not restriction, and it must
be understood that way by legislators as well as by bankers and the regulatory
agencies.
In the next five years banks will provide services they do not now provide. The
appropriate criterion for judging the aptness of new services is whether or not the
addition introduces prudent risks appropriate to a key element of the financial system.
Every change in procedure changes the risk structure of the industry. Only when
Structure of Competition, id. at 301 (1963), all reprinted in U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, STUDIES IN BANKINo
COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE (1966).

11 THEODORE G. FLRCHSIG, BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:

A STATISTICAL STUDY OF FACTORS AFFECTING RATES ON BANK LOANS (1965); NEw YoRK STATE BANK NO

DE.P'T, BRANCH BANKING, BAx MERGERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (x964).
-i1964 FDIC ANN. REP. 144. The FDIC definition of banking offices differs from the Federal Reserve
definition in certian respects, the principal one being FDIC inclusion of nondeposit trust company
offices. The decline in persons per banking office where state-wide branching was practiced was 898;
the decline in states with limited-area branching was 821. The only state in the nation where the
persons-per-banking-office ratio rose was Nebraska, and that increase (2 persons) was insignificant. The
ratio of persons per banking office is heavily influenced by the extent to which a state's population lives
in urban areas where dose physical proximity to an office is possible despite a very high ratio of persons
per office. Predominantly rural states likes the Dakotas have very low ratios of persons per banking
office because of the great geographical dispersion of the population.
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changes contain the potential for unusually large risk should they be proscribed.
The only thing a bank has to sell is service, and the service provided must change
with shifting demands. As Karl Bopp, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, recently remarked concerning the growth of our nation and its financial
institutions:
To meet our growing financial requirements, the following alternatives were possible:
I. Existing financial institutions could expand their operations to encompass new
needs, or
2. Additional institutions could be established as financial demands evolved.

In fact, existing institutions were either reluctant to meet or unable to satisfy
fully our dynamic demand for financial services. As a result, new institutions were
established as new needs became more evident. 14
At times a struggle develops between banks and the regulators concerning appropriate
activities for the banks to undertake, and this is understandable. Such struggles can

be kept to a minimum, however, by advance planning. How often do bankers sit
down with regulators to discuss where the banking industry is headed and what
changes in regulations might be appropriate to foster development along the indicated
lines? Probably not often enough.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The regulation of banking is the oldest and in many ways the most comprehensive
regulation of private business to be found in the United States. Its unique characteristics derive from the fact that banks serve not only as a repository of the major
portion of the nation's circulating medium but also as the mechanism through which
money is created or extinguished by the central bank. At the same time, since banks
also serve as the major supplier of credit to individuals and businesses, large and
small, it is essential that a workable, nondestructive degree of competition be main-

tained within the banking system.
Bank regulation-like banking itself-is in the process of change. It has achieved
its basic objective-to help guard the public against bank failures-as the record for
the past third of a century illustrates. In the future the major problem will be to
assure that regulation neither holds back nor overstimulates the necessary growth of
banking to meet the everchanging requirements of a dynamic economic system. At

the same time, regulation at both the state and federal level must be of such excellence
that the dual system of banking is continued and strengthened.
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